Abstract. In this work we consider two protocols for performing cryptanalysis and security enhancement. The first one by Jiang et al., is a password-based authentication scheme 1 which does not use smart cards. We note that this scheme is an improvement over Chen et al.'s scheme shown vulnerable to the off-line dictionary attack by Jiang et al. We perform a cryptanalysis on Jiang at al.'s improved protocol and observe that it is prone to the clogging attack, a kind of denial of service (DoS) attack. We then suggest an improvement on the protocol to prevent the clogging attack. The other protocol we consider for analysis is by Wang et al. This is a smart card based authentication protocol. We again perform the clogging (DoS) attack on this protocol via replay. We observe that all smart card based authentication protocols which precede the one by Wang et al., and require the server to compute the computationally intensive modular exponentiation are prone to the clogging attack. We suggest (another) improvement on the protocol to prevent the clogging attack, which also applies to the protocol by Jiang et. al.
Introduction
In a cyber environment, user authentication can enable a perimeter device (a firewall, proxy server, VPN server, remote access server, etc.) to decide whether or not to approve a specific user's request to gain entry to the network.
It is necessary to be able to identify and authenticate users with a high level of certainty, so that they may be held accountable should their actions threaten the security and productivity of the network. The more confidence network administrators have that a user is who they say they are, the more confidence they will have in allowing those users specific privileges; and the more faith they will have in their network devices' internal records regarding that user. Reliable user authentication can help achieve what are necessary elements in basic network security positively identifying someone; allowing them specific rights; and holding them accountable for their actions should they compromise the security and productivity of the network for other users on the network.
Multi-factor authentication is as an approach to cyber-security authentication, in which the user of a system is required to provide more than one form of verification in order to prove their identity and allowed access to the system. It takes advantage of a combination of several factors of authentication; three major factors include verification by: (1) something a user knows (such as a password), (2) something the user has (such as a smart card or a security token), and (3) something the user is (such as the use of biometrics). Due to their increased complexity, authentication systems using a multi-factor configuration are harder to break than ones using a single factors.
The first such multi-factor authentication protocol we consider here is by Jiang et al. [1] . It is a memory device aided password authentication protocol. In this kind of protocols (e.g. [1] , [4] , [6] ), the authentication information (issued by a server) is stored in a memory device such as universal serial bus (USB) sticks, portable HDDs, mobile phones, PDAs, PCs etc. A very common example is a software protection dongle that is used frequently now-a-days for various purposes.
The other protocol we consider by Wang et al. [3] is a smart card based authentication protocol. Smart card based password authentication (e.g. [2] , [3] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] ) is one of the most convenient and effective two-factor authentication mechanisms for remote systems. This technique has been widely deployed for various kinds of authentication applications, such as remote host login, online banking, shopping on the internet, e-commerce and e-health. Also, it constitutes the basis of three-factor authentication. However, there still exists challenges in both security and performance aspects due to the stringent security requirements and resource strained characteristics of the clients.
Our Results
We first analyze the protocol by Jiang et al. Their protocol is an improvement over Chen et al.'s [4] protocol which they show to be insecure against the offline password guessing attack. There are protocols in the literature which came before Chen et al.'s protocol e.g. [6] , that have been shown to be vulnerable against some form of attacks. We find Jiang et al.'s protocol to be insecure against the clogging attack, a form of denial of service (DoS). The inherent vulnerability lies in the usage of the computationally intensive modular exponentiation by the server in the authentication process. We then present a fix to prevent an attacker to perform such an attack on the protocol. We note there has been another recent protocol by the same authors which is smart card based [2] . We observe that protocol also to be insecure against the clogging attack.
The second protocol we analyze is a smart card based protocol by Wang et. al [3] . They have actually claimed their protocol to be secure against DoS. But we however find the protocol to be insecure against the clogging attack. We show an attacker can exploit the fact their protocol uses multiple modular exponentiations for authentication. A replay attack can be launched on their protocol to achieve a bigger clogging attack. However clogging attack can be done on this protocol in the classical way (without replays). We propose a way of making the protocol secure against this attack. This fix also works for the protocol by Jiang et al. to make it immune against clogging attacks. Our observation is modular exponentiation is a technique which guarantees a level of security. But it might lead to an easy insecurity just in case it is used without an additional level of protection. Most of the multi-factor authentication protocols in the literature either smart card based, or memory device aided rely on the usage of modular exponentiation for their security. Hence some level of protection should be added to them to guarantee total security against the clogging attack.
Jiang et al.'s password based protocol
The first protocol we look at in this work is due to Jiang et al. [1] It is a remote authentication protocol, which does not involve smart cards. We however note that they had another version of the protocol which works with smart card in [2] . Once we demonstrate the vulnerability in [1] against the clogging attack, the vulnerability is easily observed to work for [2] as well. Jiang et al.'s protocol in [1] is an improvement over Chen at al.'s protocol [4] which they proved to be vulnerable against the off-line dictionary attack.
We briefly present Jiang et. al.. They prove their protocol to be immune from various attacks in [1] . However we see their protocol to be inherently vulnerable to the clogging attack (a form of the classical DoS). We present a clogging attack on the protocol. We observe their smart card based version of the protocol of [2] also to be insecure against this attack. Most of the protocols they cite in their papers [1] and [2] are vulnerable to clogging attack. We identify the mathematical basis which make the protocols vulnerable to this attack, and suggest a possible fix for them.
Review of the protocol
Jiang et. al's protocol works in five phases: Initialization, Registration, Login, Authentication, and Passoword Change. We present the protocol in Algorithm 1. We omit the password change phase since it is not required to demonstrate the clogging attack on the protocol.
Attack on Jiang el. al.'s protocol
The adversary A has the same power as assumed by Jiang et al's [1] while exposing the weaknesses of Chen et. al's protocol. We only need A to be able to read and modify the contents of messages over an insecure channel (during Login and Authentication phase of the protocol). 
Initialization Phase
Server S 1.
Step I1. Choose large prime numbers p and q such that p = 2q + 1. 2.
Step I2. Choose a generator g of Z * q , secret key x ∈ Z * q , and secure one way hash H. 3.
Step I3. Compute public key X = g x mod p.
Registration Phase
User Ui 1.
Step R1. Choose identity IDi, password P Wi. 2.
Step R2. Ui→S: {IDi, P Wi} through a secure channel.
Step R3. On receiving the registration message from Ui, S creates an entry for Ui in the account-database and stores IDi in this entry. Next, S computes
Step R4. S→Ui: {X, Yi, H, p, q}.
Step R5. Upon receiving {X, Yi, H, p, q} from S, Ui enters it locally in his/her memory device (e.g. USB stick).
Login and Authentication
Step L1. Ui chooses a random number α ∈ Z * q . 2.
Step L2. Ui computes
where T1 is the current system time of Ui. 3.
Step L3. Ui→S: {IDi, Ci, Vi, T1}.
Step V1. S checks whether IDi is valid from its stored value, and (T2 − T1) < ∆T , where T2 is the current system time for S. If either does not hold, the request is dropped, and the session is terminated. Otherwise, S computes Step V2. S→Ui: {Mi, t3}.
Step V3. On receiving the reply message from the server S, Ui checks whether T3 is valid, and Mi is equal to H(IDi Di T3). This equivalency authenticates the legitimacy of the server S, and mutual authentication between S and Ui is achieved. Otherwise S is not authenticated.
Compute Session Key
Step L3. 2. Since the message is unencrypted, A can change the timestamp T 1 to some T A so that it meets the criterion (T 2 − T A ) < ∆T . 3. A changes C i to any random garbage value C A . 4. A then sends {ID i , C A , V i , T A } to the server S.
The following is performed by the server S: The point here is the adversary A would now repeat the steps several times and make the server S compute the modular exponentiation step several times. Basically A can potentially change all the incoming login request messages from any legitimate user to S. Since modular exponentiation is computationally intensive, the victimized server spends considerable computing resources doing useless modular exponentiation rather than any real work. Thus A clogs S with useless work and therefore denies any legitimate user any service. A just needs an ID of a single valid user to perform the clogging attack repeatedly.
Clogging attack performed on other similar schemes
Jiang et al., devised another smart card based password authentication protocol in [2] . This work was an improvement over another such scheme by Chen et al. [5] . We observe, that the clogging attack performed on the current protocol under consideration can also be performed on both the protocols [2] and [5] . Both the protocols are vulnerable because, the users smart card does not encrypt the message it sends over to the server for login and authentication. This gives an adversary the chance to manipulate this message.
Proposed countermeasures from the attack
The steps to avoid the clogging attack. At the beginning of the authentication phase, the server could check whether the network address of the user is valid. It has to know the network addresses of all the registered legitimate users. In spite of that, adversary A could spoof the network address of a legitimate user and replay the login message. To prevent it, we might add a cookie exchange step at the beginning of the login phase of Jiang et al.s scheme. This step has been designed as in the well known Oakley key exchange protocol [12] .
1. The user U i chooses a pseudo-random number n 1 and sends it along with the message {ID i , C i , V i , T 1 }. 2. The server S upon receiving the message, acknowledges the message and sends its own cookie n 2 to U i . 3. The next message from U i must contain n 2 , else S rejects the message and the login request.
Security analysis of the fix. Had A spoofed the U i 's IP address, A would not get n 2 back from S. Hence A only succeeds to have the S send back an acknowledgement, but not to compute the computationally intensive modular exponentiation. Hence the clogging attack is avoided by these additional steps. Saying this, we would note that this process does not prevent the clogging attack but only thwarts it to some extent. This fix can fully work if n 1 , and n 2 are encrypted respectively by the U i s and Ss private keys for a secure communication.
Wang et al.'s smart card based protocol
We briefly present a very recent smart card based authentication protocol by Wang et. al. [3] . They claim their protocol to be immune from the DoS attack. They assume a situation of a stolen smart card to prove this. However we see their protocol to be inherently vulnerable to the clogging (DoS) attack. The attacker would not have to steal the smart card to perform a clogging attack on their protocol. We present a clogging attack on the protocol via Replay. We however note a replay is not necessary to perform this attack on this protocol. But a replay step by the attacker, makes the clogging attack more effective. Most of the smart card based protocols they cite in their paper [3] are vulnerable to this attack.
Review of the protocol
Wang et. al's protocol (as like most other smart card based protocols), has the Registration, Login, and the Verification phases. We present the protocol in Algorithm 2.
Replay Attack on Wang el. al.'s protocol
A replay attack is a form of network attack in which a valid data transmission is maliciously or fraudulently repeated or delayed. Replays can be used to gain unauthorized access, or may be done simply to perform a DoS. This is carried out either by the originator or by an adversary who intercepts the data and retransmits it, possibly as part of a masquerade attack by IP packet substitution (such as stream cipher attack). Wang el. al.'s protocol [3] was claimed to be secured against replay attacks but as we see, we have been able to perform a replay attack on this protocol to achieve a DoS. We assume the protocol is known to A (i.e. not security under obscurity).
1. A intercepts a valid login request (
That is, it performs A→S: {C 1 , CID i , M i } a large number of times. 3. This will force S i perform three modular exponentiations
v mod p, and C 2 = g v mod p of Step V1. 4. A can intercept whatever replies S i sends (Step V1) and discard them (they would anyway be lost since SC will not expect these replies).
2: Wang et. al.'s scheme (contd.) Server S 1.
Step V5. Upon receiving {C4} from Ui, the server S first computes C * 4 = H2(IDi IDS Y1 C2 k KS) and then checks if C * 4 equals the received value of C4. If this verification holds, S authenticates the user Ui and the login request is accepted else the connection is terminated.
Compute Session Key
User Ui
We note that the attacker A can simply send fake login requests to the server S and could have launched the clogging (DoS) attack having forced S to perform
x mod p on Step V1. But this replay attack results in a bigger DoS attack on S since it is forced to perform three modular exponentiations (in place of just one). A will need to send much lesser number messages to S to clog it. This replay attack is possible because, unlike Jiang et. al's protocol, Wang et at.'s protocol does not have a timestamp check.
Proposed countermeasures from the attack
The steps to avoid replay attack resulting in clogging attack. As we observe replay attacks also might be possible on most Smart card based protocols because their security relies on the computationally intensive modular exponentiation, and the messages are not by default encrypted. This is very often overlooked, since the natural result of a replay is not a DoS. A few steps to avoid these attacks on Wang et. al's Protocol (and in all Smart Card based protocols in general) would be 1. U i uses a time stamp T in Step L4., and S verifies it in Step V1.. The time stamp also must be encrypted in some form so that A cannot tamper with it. 2. S checks whether multiple login requests frequently comes from the same user. This reduces the chances of a reply. We say reduces because A can obtain a lot of valid user ids (they are public) and send fake login requests periodically from different ids. Or A can store various (valid) login requests over a time period, and reply them periodically.
Yet another way to prevent clogging attack. We identify the mathematical basis which make the protocols vulnerable to clogging attacks is the modular exponentiation. The complete removal of this attack again requires to encrypt all the messages between U i and S. But this would involve a key exchanging step, where each user has a private key, and a public key. The server knows the public key, and can decrypt a message encrypted by a users private key. That way, the server makes sure that the message is from a valid user, before it computes the costly modular exponentiation. This comes with a cost and depends on the level of security we want to implement. This countermeasure works for all the protocols (smart card and non smart card based).
